Thursday, November 16, 2017

Look West again, towards Paris

My article Look West again, towards Paris appeared last week in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle

Here is the link...

A PMO release said Prime Minister Modi appreciated “the invaluable contribution” of business leaders from both countries.

The Narendra Modi government is well aware that it needs to diversify its diplomatic relations if it wants to play a major role in the world. While the Indian media regularly covers the “Look East” or “Act East” vision, which translates into closer contacts with nations like Japan, Vietnam and Australia, “Look and Act West” is often overlooked. Perhaps it’s happening in a more discreet manner, such as in the case of relations with France.
Besides the recent visit of French defence minister Florence Parly and the forthcoming visit of foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian (seen as a precursor to the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to India in the second week of December), the last few weeks have seen important visitors, putting Indo-French ties on a new launchpad towards deeper collaboration in several fields.
In September, the president of the Movement of the Enterprises of France (MEDEF), Pierre Gattaz, visited India. MEDEF is the largest French employers’ federation, representing over 800,000 member-companies. Known as “boss of the bosses” (patron des patrons), Mr Gattaz was accompanied by a 60-member delegation to “help India innovate and create jobs with expertise in infrastructure, renewable energy, waste and water treatment and smart cities”.
The delegation toured New Delhi, Mumbai and Bengaluru, where it met government officials and business groups like Ficci and CII. In Bengaluru, Mr Gattaz asserted: “We want to be in India for the next 30 years and become one of the best partners in India’s development path. India needs the skills and expertise that French businesses can provide. Our objective is to create one million jobs a month in India.”
A PMO release said Prime Minister Modi appreciated “the invaluable contribution” of business leaders from both countries.
A few days later, the diplomatic adviser to the French President and the NSA’s counterpart, Philippe Etienne, visited New Delhi. On October 4, at his meeting with the PM, Mr Etienne briefed Mr Modi “on the strengthening ties between India and France in all sectors, including in the areas of defence and security”. At this meeting, Mr Modi fondly recalled his successful visit to France in June 2017. He told his interlocutor that defence and security were the two important pillars of the India-France partnership.
Mr Modi had paid a short visit to Paris on June 3 to acquaint himself with Mr Macron. The talks between the two leaders mainly centered around the Paris Conference on the environment as US President Donald Trump had just announced American withdrawal from the Paris Accord.
Speaking afterwards, Mr Modi declared that the Paris climate deal reflects “our duty towards protecting the mother earth and our natural resources. For us, protection of the environment is an article of faith”. Perhaps more important, a “current of understanding” had passed between the two leaders.
The recent visit of Ms Parly must be seen in this perspective: a special relationship, which already works, needs to bloom further. Of course, it includes the field of defence, particularly selling more Rafale combat planes, which is on the table, at least, for the French and the Indian Air Force.
Before the visit, a national newspaper noted: “After selling 36 Rafale fighter jets to India for $8.7 billion (`58,000 crores) last year, the French government is now pushing for a project to manufacture warplanes in India to give a boost to Prime Minister Modi’s push to encourage local manufacturing under ‘Make in India’.”
A defence ministry official said though Ms Parly’s visit “is aimed towards strengthening defence cooperation, offering a production line in India for Rafale jets will surely be on the cards”. It is not known if this was discussed between Ms Parly and defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman, but it is significant that the French minister travelled to Nagpur to launch a joint production facility between Dassault Aviation and Reliance to fulfil the Rafale deal’s offset obligation. Around Rs 20,000 crores need to be invested by the French. Ms Parly, along with Dassault Aviation chairman Eric Trappier and Reliance ADAG chairman Anil Ambani, laid the foundation stone of an aerospace park for manufacture of aircraft components.
The Dhirubhai Ambani Aerospace Park (DAAP), being set up in Nagpur’s Mihaan Special Economic Zone, will spread over 289 acres. It is due to be the largest greenfield aerospace project in India. The Dassault–Reliance Joint Venture (JV) has already shortlisted a large number of vendors, mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, to be part of an indigenous supply chain for the Rafales. Its objective is to build a strong base for the success of the Rafale programme under the “Make In India” scheme. According to an official: “The production at the facility is expected to start in the first quarter of 2018 and phase one will be fully operational by the third quarter of 2018.”
The strengthening of Indo-French relations will greatly depend on the success of this JV. Another “test”, a difficult one at that, has been the collaboration for the construction of six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Dock in Mumbai. When asked by a reporter about France joining the Indian Navy’s project (Project-75-India) for the six new-generation submarines, Ms Parly said that the French naval group (DCNS) had proposed “a new submarine design and the associated weapons systems which are perfectly adapted to the high ambitions of the Indian Navy and incorporate cutting-edge technologies”.
Talking about the Scorpene experience, she remarked: “We already have in-depth experience of cooperation with Indian industry to build modern and effective submarines in India.” About the massive leak of confidential data in the Scorpene submarine project in Australia, she quoted Mr Macron and Mr Modi, who had said: “This matter is now behind us.”
Let us hope so.
Beyond these experiences in concretely working together, one can hope that Mr Macron’s encounter with Mr Modi in December will give a new impetus to a grand “Act West” policy.
It would also make economic and strategic sense for India to partner with France in more futuristic research projects like a fifth-generation plane or an armed drone.
Mr Modi spoke to Ms Parly about “greater cooperation in the ‘Make in India’ framework in defence manufacturing and joint research and development”. It would be beneficial not just for India, but for France as well as it would get the crucial financial support and market. Such a faraway possibility is worth thinking about.

Sunday, November 12, 2017

Why Vallabhbhai Patel strongly opposed Nehru's 'suicidal policy' of appeasement over China and Tibet

My article Why Vallabhbhai Patel strongly opposed Nehru's 'suicidal policy' of appeasement over China and Tibet appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK)

Here is the link...

For several reasons, scarce scholarly research has been done on the internal history of the Congress; the main cause is probably that a section of the party would prefer to keep the history under wrap.
Take the acute difference of opinion between Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and ‘Panditji’, how Nehru was then called by Congressmen.
In the last weeks of Patel’s life (he passed away on December 15, 1950) there was a deep split between the two leaders, leading to unilateral decisions, for which India had to pay the heaviest price.
The most serious apple of discord was Tibet’s invasion by the Chinese ‘Liberation Army’ in October of 1950. In the course of recent researches in the Indian archives, I discovered several new facts. Not only several senior Congress leaders, led by Patel, violently opposed Nehru suicidal policy, but many senior bureaucrats too, did not agree with the Prime Minister’s decisions and objected to his policy of appeasement, which lead India to lose a peaceful border.
It is usually assumed that on November 7, Sardar Patel wrote a ‘prophetic’ letter to Nehru, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. In fact, Patel used a draft given by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth.
A month after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet, Patel sent Bajpai’s note under his own signature, to Nehru, who decided to ignore thes Deputy Prime Minister’s letter. Bajpai, the most seasoned Indian diplomat, even lost his cool, witnessing the nefarious influence of KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended the Chinese interests.
On October 31, in an internal note, Bajpai detailed the sequence of events which followed Tibet’s invasion and the role of Panikkar, whose attitude was compared to the one of Sir Neville Hendersons toward Hitler.
Bajpai’s anger demonstrates the frustration of many senior officers; the account starts on July 15, when the Governor of Assam informed Delhi that, according to the information received by the local Intelligence Bureau, Chinese troops, “in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions, namely the north, north-east and south-east.” Mao was preparing to invade Tibet. The IB had reported that “one column was moving from Jyekundo in Qinghai Province, the second one from Derge in the Sikang [Eastern Tibet] Province. …The third column, which came from the Yunnan Province, had reached the Shukla Pass.”
Not only Panikkar was unable to get any confirmation, but he virtually justified Beijing’s military action by writing: “in view of frustration in regard to Formosa, Tibetan move was not unlikely.”
During the next three months, the Indian Ambassador would systematically take the Chinese side.
Sir Girja, Panikkar’s direct boss, became more and more frustrated with the Ambassador who reported to ‘Panditji’ only; after the Tibetans lost Chamdo, the capital of Kham province, Panikkar argued: “I should like to emphasise that the Chinese firmly hold that Tibet is purely an internal problem and that while they are prepared in deference to our wishes to settle question peacefully they are NOT prepared to postpone matters indefinitely.” Beijing was hinting that the Tibetans were been ready to seat at the negotiating table. It was a pure lie.
After receiving Bajpai’s note, Patel wrote back: “I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem. The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. …I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.”
Bajpai then prepared a draft for Patel to write to Nehru.
Some more details of the seriousness of the situation filter through Inside Story of Sardar Patel: The Diary of Maniben Patel, the daughter of the Sardar.
An entry on October 30 shows Patel deeply disturbed by Nehru constantly interfering in his ministry: “Jawaharlalji now trying to interfere in States' Ministry! If he has no confidence, why doesn't he tell Bapu [Patel] directly to quit,” writes Maniben.
The same day, Patel tells VP Menon, the Secretary of his Ministry, "You tell Rajaji that I don't want to keep the States Ministry".
On November 2, 1950, Maniben reports: “Rajaji and Jawaharlal had heated altercation about Tibet policy. Rajaji does not at all appreciate this policy. Rajaji very unhappy — Bapu did not speak at all.”
Later in the afternoon, “Munshi complained about Tibet policy. The question concerns the whole nation — said he had written a personal letter to Panditji on Tibet.”
Later Patel tells Munshi: “Rajaji, you [Munshi], I, Baldev Singh, [CD] Deshmukh, Jagjivan Ram and even Sri Prakash are on one side, while Gopalaswamy, Rafi, Maulana [Azad] on his side.”
There was a vertical split in the Cabinet; and it was not only about Tibet. The situation would deteriorate further during the following weeks.
On December 12, Patel was divested on his portfolios. Nehru wrote: “In view of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s ill-health it is absolutely necessary that he should have complete rest and freedom from worry, so as to be able to recuperate as rapidly as possible. …no work should be sent to him and no references made to him in regard to the work of these Ministries.”
Gopalaswami Ayyangar was allotted the Ministry of State and Nehru kept the Ministry of Home.
The Sardar was only informed after the changes were made. He was deeply upset. Three days later he passed away.
The question is why nobody has ever research these important historical issues.

Friday, November 10, 2017

Why all this fuss for a few Indian tunnels?

Rongme Ngatra Tunnel, stretching 13 kms on National Highway No 317
The meaning of ‘double standards’ is unknown in China.
After The Economic Times reported that India plans to construct 17 highway tunnels totaling 100 kilometers along the line of actual control, The Global Times bitterly complained.
The Party mouthpiece quoted Xie Chao, an ‘expert’ at Tsinghua University's Department of International Relations, who said that: “boosting border infrastructure has been Indian's consistent policy.”
A poor joke, when one knows the reality.
Another ‘expert’, Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies stated that "the tunnel building along the border is a further fermentation after the Doklam standoff."
He reiterated China’s baloney stand: “One June 18, Indian troops illegally crossed the border and trespassed into Chinese territory in Doklam.”
Fermentation or not, India is far behind China in the field of infrastructure.
Zhao dared to tell The Global Times: “Although some Indian senior officials made a friendly gesture toward China after the standoff, India has pursued its previous policy along the border - developing infrastructure as well as troop mobility.”
The Global Times commented; “The Indian government is playing two cards over the border issue, the situation of which will be a ‘new normal’ for the China-India border.”
Xie Chao warned: "It is the Chinese government's responsibility to safeguard border safety and China won't take the initiative to seek military force to tackle border problems. But a balanced force along the border will make China cope with the tensions."
Is it not ‘double standards’?
While India is 20 or 30 years behind China is terms of development of border infrastructure, the slightest improvement on the Indian side is shown by Beijing and its ‘experts’ as an aggressive move.

Infrastructure on the Tibetan side
Just read the Chinese press, you will understand.
On October 28, China Tibet News announced that the newly-built runway of Chamdo Bangda Airport was officially put into use, “ushering in a new period of rapid growth.”
A total of 19,000 flights took off or landed at Bangda Airport; it boasts of 1.876 million passenger throughput. The new runaway will improve further the traffic: “In 2015, with a total investment of 849 million yuan [150 million US dollars], the airfield renovation project was started and it was built on 4C standard,” said the website.
Chamdo Bangda Airport has already flights to Lhasa, Chengdu, and Chongqing; soon planes will be able to fly to Tianjin, Fujian, and other Mainland cities.
At the same time, the reconstruction project of the highway from Shigatse Peace Airport to Shigatse City has begun, Shigatse will become “a comprehensive transportation hub”.
It will be an important part “for Tibet's export-oriented economic development,” said the website. Practically it will be a next stage towards opening a road and railway to Nepal.
According to China Tibet News: “After this project is completed, it will improve the regional traffic conditions and play a key role in meeting Tibet's high grade highway demand.”

On October 23, another website, China Tibet Online affirmed: “China's central government continues to increase support for infrastructure construction in southwest China's Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan Province, striving to break the bottleneck that constraints the social development and people's livelihood improvement in those regions.”
According to the Chinese website: “Since 2012, Tibet has opened the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway, and the Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway also enters its construction, starting a new era in railway construction. Highway distance increased from 62,500 kilometers in 2012 to 82,100 kilometers in 2016, an increase of 25.9 percent. There are 71 domestic and international air routes connecting Tibet with 41 cities.”
And the list goes on.

Developments in Tibetan-inhabited areas
The fast-track infrastructure development is not limited to the Tibetan Autonomous Region; it extends to the Tibetans-inhabited provinces.
So why this fuss for a few Indian tunnels, which will take years to materialize?
In the power fields too, giant steps are taken on the plateau.
China Tibet Online provides details on the Sichuan-Tibet Power Interconnection Project which has recently been put into operation, “eliminating serious power shortages in Chamdo City in the Tibet and the southern part of the Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in southwest China's Sichuan Province. The total power installation capacity is 2.65 million kilowatts, 1.3 times more than that in 2012.”
It is said that it for the first time Tibet achieved net electric power transmission of 200 million kilowatts hour outwards.

More infrastructure in Sichuan
The same website further asserts that “Sichuan implemented two rounds of the ‘three-year transportation battle’, while completing and opening the Yading airport in the Daocheng County in Garze and the Hongyuan airport in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, construction on the Gesar Airport in Garze, the Chengdu-Lanzhou Railway, the Chengdu-Ya'an part of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway and the Ya'an-Kangding as well as Wenchuan-Markham Highways have also begun. At the end of 2016, the total distance of the highway in Tibetan-inhabited areas in Sichuan reached 45,200 kilometers.”
Does India complain each time, China open a dual-use airport on the plateau?

In Yunnan too
At the same time, in Yunan Province, “1,142 projects have been completed of the 1,344 major projects implemented over the last five years, and a total of 103.9 billion yuan (15.7 billion US dollars) have been invested.” While Gansu Province opened in 2013 the Xiahe Airport and the Linxia-Hezuo Highway, respectively the first civil aviation airport and the first highway in its Tibetan-habited areas, the first railway line, from Lanzhou to Hezuo, has also been under construction in 2016. There are currently 10,046 kilometers of highway, and 95 percent of villages are accessible to modern transportation in the Tibetan-inhabited areas.”
The highway coverage in Tibetan-inhabited areas of Qinghai Province reached 65,117 kilometers in 2016, increasing by 11,367 compared with 2012. The 251 townships and 1,659 villages in its Tibetan-inhabited areas are all accessible to highways.
This is not called ‘double standards’ when so-called experts complained after India struggling to provide genuine communication facilities for the border population in the Himalaya.

In the meantime, a combined army brigade under the PLA's 77th Group Army (former 13th Group Army) practiced at an altitude of 4,700 meters on the plateau area on November 7, 2017.
India is not making a fuss.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Thursday, November 9, 2017

China is reinforcing its border with India

Choekar and Yangzom wrote to Xi Jinping
My article China is reinforcing its border with India appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.


Here is the link...

The Middle Kingdom is winning the trust of the locals to safeguard its border. This must worry India. But can China win over the Tibetans who have largely been sympathetic towards India?

At the end of the 19th Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping appears to emerge the winner on most fronts. First and foremost, the 19th Congress approved an amendment to the Party Constitution, enshrining ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Er’.
Though the new Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection were more or less along the expected lines, the Politburo and the Standing Committee brought some surprises. Apart from these party issues, in his three and half hour speech, President Xi mentioned several times “border” and “minorities” areas.
Xi particularly asserted: “We will devote more energy to speeding up the development of old revolutionary base areas, areas with large ethnic minority populations, border areas, and poor areas. We will strengthen measures to reach a new stage in the large-scale development of the western region [ie  Tibet and Xinjiang].”
To start implementing his policy, the Chinese President sent a personal letter to two young Tibetan herders soon after the conclusion of the Congress. They had written to him introducing their village, north of Indian border.
According to Xinhua, Xi “encouraged a herding family in Lhuntse County, near the Himalayas in southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, to set down roots in the border area, safeguard the Chinese territory and develop their hometown.”
Safeguarding China’s territory against whom? India obviously!
Xi acknowledged “the family’s efforts to safeguard the territory, and thanked them for the loyalty and contributions they have made in the border area. Without the peace in the territory, there will be no peaceful lives for the millions of families,” he wrote.
The two Tibetan girls, Choekar and Yangzom, had told the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) Secretary General about their “experiences in safeguarding the border area and the development of their township over the years.”
Interestingly, the girls’ village, Yume, is located a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line, not far from the remote Indian village of Taksing.
Xi also hoped that the girls’ family could “motivate more herders to set down roots in the border area ‘like kalsang flowers’, and become guardians of the Chinese territory and constructors of a happy hometown.”
Yume is said to be China’s smallest town in terms of population. In the years to come, Beijing will undoubtedly put pressure on India not only by using Tibetan populations living north of the McMahon Line, but also by influencing the Indian tribes south of the Line, enticing them with a better life on the Chinese side.
Can this letter from Xi Jinping be considered as an acknowledgment of the McMahon Line, as the Indo-Tibet border? From the reporting of Xinhua, it seems so. Xi clearly thanks the two herders for ‘guarding’ the border?
Already in November 2016, China Tibet Online had mentioned Yume ‘town’ on the southern slope of the Himalayas as the border area of China and India: “If driving, you had to go south 400 km from Lhasa to Lhuntse in Shannan (‘Lhoka’ for the Tibetans) City, then there was another 200 km of muddy mountain roads before you reached Yume.”
The official website asserted that “It is the least populous administrative town in China. With an area of 1976 square km, Yume has one subsidiary village, and only nine households with a total of 32 people. Yume has very few residents, but it is not impoverished, nor backward.”
The article concluded: “For a long time, there was only one family in Yume. After the Tibet Autonomous Region Government dispatched officials and doctors, built the roads, and added a power station and a medical clinic, Yume became more and more lively. In 2015, the annual average per capita disposable income in Yume was 26,000 yuan.”
On October 12, 2016, the powerful Tibetan Autonomous Party Secretary, Wu Yingjie, surprisingly landed in the area. According to The China Daily, Wu met frontier troops posted in this remote area: “[Wu] conducted a field survey on how to promote development and stabilisation of the border region, people’s livelihood, grass-root-level Party building and poverty alleviation.”
Wu told the local residents: “You defend the border areas of our country and protect our country from being nibbled or divided. I salute you.” A flag raising ceremony was held in Yume on the occasion of the party boss’ visit.
Why so much interest in this tiny border community? Just to protect the border against India?
The China Daily notes: “Frontier soldiers and local residents patrol in the township. Every resident of the township has a strong awareness of border defense and make it part of their life.”
On the other side of the McMahon line is Taksing; it is the last village in Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh and …certainly the first place susceptible to be invaded in case the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) decides to retaliate after the recent confrontation in Doklam.
The problem is that the village still has no access road and the local inhabitants believe that it will take at least five to 10 years to see a road reaching Taksing.
It is not that nothing is happening. On April 6, 2017, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) managed to open a new section connecting Tame Chung Chung (known as TCC) and Nacho. The inhabitants living in the TTC' vicinity had dreamed of seeing this road for decades, but like many other things for the border population, it had remained a dream.
A BRO’s communiqué explained: “The area is located in an extremely remote area with rugged terrains, thick vegetation and inhospitable weather. The place has remained inaccessible since 2009.” The road was to be opened in 2009.
As an aftershock of the Doklam incident and the subsequent ‘speeding’ up of the border projects, the TTC-Taksing road may hopefully be opened in two years.
In October 2014, The Deccan Chronicle reported that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been focusing on the Taksing area: “After the recent Ladakh incursions, frequent intrusions by China’s PLA in Arunachal Pradesh’s Taksing region have come to the notice of the security agencies.”
At that time, some local villagers had managed to shoot a short video on their phones of the PLA ‘visiting’ their village.
In the meantime, China is building up pressure by enticing and cajoling the Tibetan population on their side of the McMahon Line.
In several places, China has started developing ‘border’ infrastructure on fast track, bringing large number of Chinese tourists; not only to Yume, but also in Metok County, north of Upper Siang district or Lepo village, near Khenzimane on the McMahon Line.
Xi’s letter tends to show that Beijing has decided to use more and more the local Tibetan populations in border areas to ‘defend’ the Middle Kingdom’s borders. This should deeply worry Delhi; so far the Tibetan population has been sympathetic towards India, can China manage to change this?

Tuesday, November 7, 2017

Tibet: When Patel and Bajpai opposed Nehru

About my latest book

It is usually assumed that Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India wrote the ‘prophetic’ letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. A new book proves that Patel used a draft given by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth.
On November 7, 1950, a month after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet, Patel sent Bajpai’s note under his own signature, to Nehru, who decided to ignore Patel’s letter. The next day, meeting Bajpai in the corridors of South Block, the Prime Minister told his General Secretary: “you are marshalling the big shots”. Bajpai, deeply upset by the turn of events (which were influenced by KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended the Chinese interests), had also written to President Rajendra Prasad and C Rajagopalachari.
Reproduced below are extracts of Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation: India Tibet Relations (1947-1962). It deals with a first note of Bajpai on the sequence of events and the nefarious role of Panikkar.
The October 31’s note written by Bajpai is historically important for several reasons; first and foremost because after it was sent to Sardar Patel, the latter asked for a draft for a letter to be sent to Nehru; Bajpai’s note also shows the frustration of many senior officers in the Ministry and provides a precise chronology of the tragic events of Summer and Fall 1950.


[Extracts] 
G.S. Bajpai’s Note of October 31
…Bajpai first noted that on July 15, 1950, the Governor of Assam had informed Delhi that, according to information received by the local Intelligence Bureau, Chinese troops, “in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions, namely the north, north-east and south-east.” The IB had reported that one column was moving from Jyekundo in Qinghai Province, the second one from Derge in the Sikang Province. …The third column, which came from the Yunnan Province, had reached the Shukla Pass.”
The same day, the Indian Embassy in China reported that rumours in Beijing had been widely “prevalent during the last two days that military action against Tibet has already begun.”
Though Panikkar was unable to get any confirmation, he virtually justified Beijing’s military action by writing: “in view of frustration in regard to Formosa, Tibetan move was not unlikely.”
…[A few days later], Bajpai remarked that the Ambassador [Panikkar] had “answered [Delhi] that he did not consider the time suitable for making a representation to the Chinese Foreign Office. Panikkar gave the following reasons:
  1. The Chinese have been anxious to settle the question by peaceful negotiations and had offered Tibetans autonomy and invited Tibetan representations to Peking;
  2. Tibet had been stalling negotiations on one excuse or another.
  3. Since military action was reported to have already started, ‘any such suggestion now will only meet with rebuff’.
…Bajpai is more and more frustrated with Panikkar’s surrender to Chinese interests and perhaps also by the support that the ambassador gets from the Prime Minister. The Secretary General is clearly in a difficult position.
…Already on July 20, Panikkar’s attention had been drawn by South Block to the fact that Beijing’s argument that the ‘Tibetans had been stalling the talks’, was wrong.
Panikkar had been informed by Delhi that the Tibetan Delegation should not be blamed for something they are not responsible for “…The Tibetan Delegation have been awaiting a reply to the communication of their Government to the Chinese Government.”

Panikkar brings in philosophical issues

…India [Panikkar] attempted to change the Communist regime’s decision to ‘liberate’ Tibet, by bringing a philosophical angle to the issue: “In the present dangerous world situation, a military move can only bring a world nearer [to a conflict], and any Government making such a move incurs the risk of accelerating the drift towards that catastrophe.”
Mao was not in the least bothered about such niceties.
…As the preparations on the Chinese side continued, Panikkar wrote to Delhi on August 13 to inform the ministry that he has been unable to meet Zhou Enlai, who is ‘ill with dysentery’, but he had met Chang Han-Fu, the Vice Foreign Minister: …”Unfortunately, nothing is mentioned by the Ambassador, either about the inappropriateness of military operations in the prevailing international situation or the absurdity of General Liu Bosheng’s reference to an imperialist control over the Tibetan authorities”, comments Bajpai.

Another Aide-Memoire
…Delhi again repeats its ‘philosophical’ position: it would be bad for Beijing to invade Tibet: “The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in inter-national affairs.”
…Delhi is convinced that ‘the position of China will be weakened’ by a [Chinese] military solution.

The Chinese plans are clear

… the objective of Mao and the Southwestern Bureau in Chengdu is to occupy Chamdo, it is therefore clear that the PLA is preparing to enter ‘Tibet proper’. Though the plans for the military action are ready, the logistic is not. The objective remains the fall of Chamdo before the winter, ambassador or no ambassador, negotiation or no negotiations.
On the front, the preparations are going on full swing.

On October 7, 1950, Tibet is invaded
On October 11, The Statesman in Kolkata publishes a report saying: “Communist forces had penetrated 50 miles into Tibet from the Sino-Tibetan border.” The Ministry in Delhi had not heard anything.
…Panikkar is told that if there had been Chinese military movement in Tibet recently, “he should draw the attention of the Chinese Government to our grave concern about this development.”

Sir Girja’s narrative continues
On October 17, the Indian Ambassador receives the full details of the Chinese invasion of Tibet. South Block confirms that Tibet has been invaded, it was “brought to our notice at the request of the Tibetan Government in a message sent through our Mission in Lhasa,” says a cable from Delhi.
…The next day, Panikkar continues to argue against the invasion having happened; he says that out of the incidents to which Lhasa has drawn Delhi’s attention, only one appears to be new. He adds that the telegram from the Indian Mission “did not indicate whether Changtu [Chamdo] was definitely identified as Changtu in Tibet.” Handwritten in the margin is “the suggestion was that there was another Changtu in the Chinese Province of Sikang.”

Bajpai more and more upset
…Sir Girja Bajai is obviously upset; he writes that the rest of the ambassador’s telegram deserves quotation in full. We can understand why.
Panikkar first argues: “Further I should like to emphasise that the Chinese firmly hold that Tibet is purely an internal problem and that while they are prepared in deference to our wishes to settle question peacefully they are NOT prepared to postpone matters indefinitely.”
This is written by the Ambassador of India.

On October 22, Nehru writes to Panikkar
…Nehru cables the Ambassador in Beijing: “Our information from Lhasa is that Chinese forces are still advancing and Riwoche, Dzokangdzong, Markhan and Chamdo have fallen. Also that Lhodzong is expected to fall soon. Unless it is clear that these forces are halted and there is no imminent danger of invasion of Tibet, there is little chance of Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peking.” …The Prime Minister continues: “I confess I am completely unable to understand urgency behind Chinese desire to ‘liberate’ when delay CANNOT possibly change situation to her disadvantage.”

Another aide-memoire is presented

Finally on October 24, the Ambassador presents an aide-memoire to the Chinese Foreign Office. Bajpai notes “The contrast between the tone and content of the instructions sent to the Ambassador, and his feeble and apologetic ‘note’ deserves notice.”
This raises a question, how could the ambassador present an aide-memoire without its content being vetted by South Block?
It is a mystery.
…Bajpai could only conclude that “from the foregoing narrative which I have been at some pains to document, that ever since the middle of July, at least, Peking’s objective has been to settle the problem of its relations by force.”
…As we shall see from Chinese archives, particularly from Mao’s cables, the invasion (or ‘liberation’ for the Chinese side) did not at all depend on ‘negotiations’ or ‘talks’ with Tibetans. The army action had been decided since months.
…Though Bajpai, a seasoned diplomat is aware of what is going on, he is caught up in the system with the strong-willed Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) dominating the scene and a ‘darbari’ Ambassador.
Remains the fact that Chinese excuses or pretexts (or the one advanced by the Indian Ambassador in China) do not make sense, Bajpai admits it: “What justification there is for Chinese fear of American aggression must remain a matter of opinion. What, in my opinion, is not open to dispute is that however well-founded such fears, they cannot justify either Peking’s invasion of Tibet or Peking’s discourtesy to and suspicion of us.”
Though Bajpai says that he is not interested to find ‘scapegoats’, he finally blames his ambassador to China: “In examining the larger implications of China’s policy towards Tibet, the role of any individual must have relatively minor significance. The search for scapegoats is neither pleasant nor fruitful, and I have no desire to indulge in any such pastime. Before concluding this paper, however, I feel it my duty to observe that, in handling the Tibetan issue with the Chinese Government, our Ambassador has allowed himself to be influenced more by the Chinese point of view, by Chinese claims, by Chinese maps and by regard for Chinese susceptibilities than by his instructions or by India’s interests. Ample justification for this comment exists in the telegram from which I have quoted.”
This is a strong, though late indictment of Panikkar.

Patel replies to Bajpai
…When on October 31, a copy of Bajpai’s note goes to Sardar Patel, the latter writes back to Bajpai: “I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem. The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. …I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.”

A few days later, Bajpai would write a draft for Patel to shoot his famous letter. Nehru would not even acknowledge it…
Patel passed away five weeks later.
The rest is history.


Sunday, November 5, 2017

Did Xi Jinping acknowledge the McMahon Line?

Soon after the conclusion of the 19th Congress, President Xi Jinping wrote a letter to two young Tibetan herders who had written to him introducing their village, Yume, north of Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh.
According to Xinhua, Xi “encouraged a herding family in Lhunze [Lhuntse] County, near the Himalayas in southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region, to set down roots in the border area, safeguard the Chinese territory and develop their hometown.”
Xi acknowledged “the family's efforts to safeguard the territory, and thanked them for the loyalty and contributions they have made in the border area. Without the peace in the territory, there will be no peaceful lives for the millions of families," he wrote.
The two Tibetan girls, Choekar and Yangzom had told the CCP’s Secretary General about their “experiences in safeguarding the border area and the development of their township over the years.”
Interestingly, the girls’ village, Yume (or Yumai or Yulmed) is located a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line, not far from the remote Indian village of Takshing.
Can this letter from Xi Jinping be considered as an acknowledgment of the McMahon Line, as the Indo-Tibet border? Xi clearly thanks the two herders for 'guarding' the border?
From the reporting of Xinhua, it seems so.
Xi further hoped that the girls’ family could “motivate more herders to set down roots in the border area ‘like galsang flowers’, and become guardians of the Chinese territory and constructors of a happy hometown.”
Galsang or Kelsang Flower
The report also explained that Yume is China's smallest town in terms of population.

Yume on this blog
I had mentioned Yume several times on this blog, mainly because Yume Gompa was the last stage of the Tsari pilgrimage (see map below).
Already in November 2016, China Tibet Online spoke of Yume ‘town’ on the southern slope of the Himalayas as the border area of China and India: "If driving, you had to go south 400 km from Lhasa to Luntse of Lhoka (Shannan) City, then there was another 200 km of muddy mountain roads before you reached Yulmed.”
The Chinese site then asserted that “It is the least populous administrative town in China. With an area of 1976 square km, Yulmed has one subsidiary village, and only nine households with a total of 32 people. Yulmed has very few residents, but it is not impoverished nor backward.”
It added: “For a long time, there was only one family in Yulmed. After the Tibet Autonomous Region government dispatched officials and doctors, built the roads, and added a power station and a medical clinic, Yulmed became more and more lively. In 2015, the annual average per capita disposable income in Yulmed was 26,000 yuan.”

Four conclusions
By Xi Jinping admitting that Yume is a 'border' village, can it be concluded that Xi has acknowledged the McMahon Line? Probably not, but he has admitted that it was the present border (Line of Actual Control).
Another issue that I already brought up earlier on this blog: why not reopen the Tsari Pilgrimage and use it as a Confidence Building Measure between India and China?
Another conclusion is that China will develop very fast the 'border' areas in the years to come, I have often mentioned Metok County, but also Lepo village, north of Khenzimane on the McMahon Line.
Finally, it looks like the Communist Party has started to more and more use Tibetans in border areas and elsewhere yo defend the Middle Kingdom’s borders.
Delhi should be worried!




 

Sunday, October 29, 2017

Is Mr Xi the winner?

Front-page of 6 different newspapers in China
My article Is Mr Xi the winner? appeared in The Statesman.

Here is the link...

At the end of the 19th Congress, most of the Western media have declared President Xi Jinping, the winner. He is the most powerful leader since Mao, say the China watchers. But is it true? A great difference between Mao and Xi is that the Great Helmsman controlled the Communist apparatus without intervening much in the day-to-day affairs.
He often travelled the countryside in luxurious trains for weeks, with just a few secretaries and several of his favourite ‘nurses’. He had no encrypted way of communicating with his colleagues (or ‘lackeys’ in Maoist parlance) in Beijing. He was not bothered. This is not the case of Xi Jinping who heads a large number of Leading Small Groups on many topics under the Middle Kingdom’s sky, but he is also General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People’s Republic of China, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Battle Command.
Xi has however undoubtedly emerged as the winner on several fronts in recent months. First and foremost, the 19th Congress approved an amendment to the Party Constitution enshrining Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
Though the new Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are more or less along the expected lines, the Politburo and the Standing Committee brought some surprises. The new Politburo’s Standing Committee now comprises President Xi, Premier Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji and Han Zheng.
The presence of Li Zhanshu, Xi’s chief of staff, who is to take over the chairmanship of the National People’s Congress, is a proof of Xi’s control over the appointments. Ditto for Wang Huning, the party theorist who will take the charge of ideology, propaganda and party organization, while Zhao Leji will replace Wang Qishan, as the new antigraft tsar. Wang Yang will take the seat of Yu Zhengsheng as chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; as for Han Zheng, he will probably be drafted as Executive Vice-Premier in March.
But where are Xi’s presumed successors, Hu Chunhua and Chen Miner? Where is Wang Qishan, Xi’s right-hand man who, for five years, arrested the ‘tigers and the flies’? The absence in the Standing Committee of Chen Miner, the Party Secretary of Chongqing, who was expected to be anointed ‘heir apparent’ has been noticeable. Apparently Xi does not want a ‘successor’ as yet. Same for Hu Chunhua, Guangdong Party Secretary, who for several years was said to be a future new General Secretary.
Just before the Congress, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) which has been by far the bestinformed, noted: “Hu Chunhua ~ the widely tipped successor ~ and the president’s protégé, Chongqing party chief Chen Miner, are both likely to be missing from the Politburo Standing Committee. Instead, they will join the Politburo, which is one rank lower.” It is what happened. SCMP had good tips, despite the opacity of the party proceedings. The great surprise was that Wang Qishan, who is responsible for making thousands of party heads roll, has stepped down from the Standing Committee, due the age-limit norm.
It was confirmed when his name did not appear in the list of the new Central Committee members. Many ‘watchers’ were expecting Xi to break an unwritten retirement-age rule to keep his friend Wang in the Standing Committee. Two members of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) made it to the Politburo. Apart from Air Force General Xu Qiliang, presently CMC ViceChairman, General Zhang Youxia, a family friend of Xi, was selected as the second vicechairman.
Contrary to what many have written, Xi might not be all-powerful; he still has to deal with party norms and traditions: “He is careful not to break the age rule and to follow the order of seniority. These political norms are critical for the 89-million member Communist Party to have consensus at the top and maintain stability,” wrote the SCMP which also noted: “Xi is also not blindly following the established path.” Another sign that Xi may not have full control, is the reduced size of the CMC which has only 7 members (apart from the two Vice-Chairmen: Xu Qiliang, Zhang Youxia, others are Wei Fenghe, Li Zuocheng, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin) compared to 11 during the previous Congress. The day after the announcement of the new CMC, Xi met the PLA delegation and urged them to “follow the road maps set for it at the Congress.”
It is easier to agree on 7 than 11. Xi said socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, and the military should make all-out efforts to become a world-class force by 2050 while striving for the realization of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. Xi ordered the PLA to be absolutely loyal to the party, to focus on how to win in wars, to pioneer reforms and innovation, to scientifically manage commanding a unit and to lead troops in accordance with the strictest standards. Strangely, there was no photo with the new CMC.
Another odd happening: General Song Puxuan, one of the rising star’s in the PLA and the newly appointed head of the CMC’s Logistics Support Department did not make it to the list of the Central Committee’ members. In 2014, Song was promoted to the rank of full general, taking the charge of the Northern Theatre Command, overseeing the defence of the capital and China’s border with North Korea. His failure to make it to the Central Committee is still unexplained. When the list of the delegates to the Congress was first released in July, many watchers thought that it would mark a new area for women, who made up 24.1 per cent of the 2,287 delegates. The official media pointed out that it reflected the efforts made by the party “to give women members a bigger say and improve gender equality and social stability.”
But Chinese women leaders are still practically excluded from the top of the hierarchy. Of the 204 members of the Central Committee, just 10 are women; the same figure as that for the 18th congress of 2012. And only one lady, Sun Chunlan made it in the Politburo. She will probably retain her job as Chief of the United Front Work Department.
That is disappointing. As for the ethnic minorities, they have got a slightly better deal in the Central Committee, with 16 members from ethnic origins compared to 10, five years ago. Incidentally, the Tibetans have four representatives who have been selected as members of the Central Committee (Lobsang Gyaltsen and Che Dalha) and Alternate members (Norbu Thondup and Yan Jinhai, a Tibetan from Qinghai); it is a first. Further, Wang Huning, the newly-appointed member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee will probably represent Tibet at the National People’s Congress in March. The question is why should a Han leader represent Tibet?
Han chauvinism will continue for some time more. In any case, Wang’s presence does not mean that life will become easier for the Tibetans or the Uyghurs. Chen Quanguo, the former Party Tibet Secretary presently posted in Xinjiang, has been rewarded with a seat in the Politburo for the repressive measures he introduced in the restive Muslim region.
What does all this mean for India? One will have to wait and see. As Deng Xiaoping liked to say, ‘Let us seek truth from facts’.

Thursday, October 26, 2017

Xi may not be all powerful

My article Xi may not be all powerful appeared in Rediff.com.

Here is the link...

'He still has to deal with party norms and traditions and has been careful to follow the order of seniority,' points out Claude Arpi.

Nearly thirty years ago, one of the best China watchers, Belgium-born Simon Leys wrote about the ‘Art of Communist China watching’ in the New Times Book Review: “Without an ability to decipher non-existent inscriptions written in invisible ink on blank pages, no one should ever dream of analyzing the nature and reality of Chinese communism. Very few people have mastered this demanding discipline.”
Leys was reviewing a book written by Father Laszlo Ladany, a Jesuit priest living in Hong Kong, who ‘with good reason’ was acknowledged as the doyen of the ‘watchers’.
For many years, Father Ladany published a weekly China News Analysis. Leys said: “all China watchers used to read his newsletter with avidity; many stole from it—but generally they took great pains never to acknowledge their indebtedness or to mention his name. Father Ladany watched this charade with sardonic detachment.”
I could not help thinking of these words while watching the unfolding of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
Till the last minute, it was difficult to make out what would happen next.

Xi Jinping the Winner

Xi Jinping undoubtedly emerged the winner on most of the fronts.
First and foremost, the 19th Congress approved an amendment to the Party Constitution enshrining ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’.
Though the new Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are more of less along the expected lines, the Politburo and the Standing Committee brought some surprises.

The new lineup
The new Politburo’s Standing Committee now comprises of President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji and Han Zheng.
The South China Morning Post commented: “The unveiling of the new lineup of Chinese leadership marks the climax of the twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle after months-long intense horse trading and power struggles in the lead-up to the 19th party congress.”
The presence of Li Zhanshu, Xi’s chief of staff, who is to take over the chairmanship of the National People’s Congress is a proof of Xi’s control over the appointments. Ditto for Wang Huning, the party theorist who should take the charge of ideology, propaganda and party organization, while Zhao Leji will replace Wang Qishan, as the new anti-graft tsar.
Wang Yang will take the seat of Yu Zhengsheng as chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The Surprises

A noticeable absence is Chen Miner, the Party Secretary of Chongqing, who in many quarters, was expected to be anointed ‘heir apparent’. Apparently Xi did not want a ‘successor’ as yet.
A few days ago, The South China Morning Post (SCMP), belonging to Xi’s friend, Jack Ma, the owner of Alibaba, and which has been by far the best-informed during the entire Congress, noted: “Guangdong party chief Hu Chunhua – the widely tipped successor – and the president’s protégé, Chongqing party chief Chen Miner, are both likely to be missing from the Politburo Standing Committee. Instead, they will join the Politburo, which is one rank lower.”
It is what happened. Does it mean that China watching is easier today than in the days of Father Ladany?
Not really as the opacity of the Party proceedings has not changed much.
The great surprise was that Wang Qishan, who is responsible for making thousands of heads on the Party roll, has stepped down from the Standing Committee, due the age-limit norm. It was confirmed when his name did not appear in the list of the new Central Committee members. Many ‘watchers’ were expecting Xi to break an unwritten retirement-age rule to keep his friend and colleague Wang in the Standing Committee.
Two members of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) made it to the Politburo. Apart from Air Force General Xu Qiliang, presently CMC Vice-Chairman, General Zhang Youxia, a family friend of Xi, was selected as the second vice-chairman.

Constitutional Changes
Adding Xi’s name in the Party constitution brings him at par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Xi now dreams to make China into a great Socialist power by 2050
Xi promised that China, under his leadership, will be an upholder of world peace and stability; his announcement that the Middle Kingdom was ready to play a greater role in building ‘a common destiny for mankind’, is taken by many with a pinch of salt. Only the future will tell.

Other changes worth noting:
•    Party's 'absolute' leadership over the Army
In a resolution approved by the Congress, Xi Jinping's military thinking and the Party's ‘absolute’ leadership over the armed forces have been included in the Constitution.

•    'Belt and Road' named in the Constitution
The Belt and Road Initiative, also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) is now mentioned in the Constitution. The Congress agreed that "following the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration,” the Belt and Road Initiative should be named.
The China Daily explains: “proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative aims to build a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along and beyond the ancient Silk Road trade routes.”
India has objected to the fact that a segment of the scheme goes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The inclusion of OBOR will not solve this issue, on the contrary, it could be further exacerbated.

•    Fight against corruption should go on
The revised Constitution says that the Party must make comprehensive efforts to ensure that ‘the fight against corruption keeps going’.
On October 18, Xi Jinping called corruption ‘the greatest threat’ that the Party faces. The Party will soon adopt a national anti-corruption legislation and create a corruption reporting platform which will cover both disciplinary inspection commissions and supervision agencies, said Xi.

Not all-powerful

Contrary to what many have written, Xi might not be all-powerful; he still has to deal with Party norms and traditions: “he is careful not to break the age rule and to follow the order of seniority. These political norms are critical for the 89-million member Communist Party to have consensus at the top and maintain stability,” wrote the SCMP which also noted: “Xi is also not blindly following the established path. He has made a decision with far-reaching consequences in not naming a clear-cut successor and promoting his choice to the Politburo Standing Committee.”
Another sign that Xi may not have full control, is the reduced size of the CMC which has only 7 members (apart from the two Vice Chairmen: Xu Qiliang, Zhang Youxia, others are Wei Fenghe, Li Zuocheng, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin) compared to 11 during the previous Congress.

The role of women
When the list of the delegates to the Congress was first released in July, many watchers thought that it would mark a new area for women, who made up 24.1 per cent of the 2,287 delegates.
The official media pointed out that it reflected the efforts made by the Party “to give women members a bigger say and improve gender equality and social stability.”
But Chinese women leaders are still practically excluded from the top of the hierarchy. Of the 204 members of the Central Committee, just 10 are women; the same figure that for the 18th congress of 2012. And only one lady, Sun Chunlan made it in the Politburo. She will probably retain her job as Chief of the United Front Work Department. That is disappointing.

The ‘ethnic minorities’
As for the ethnic minorities, they have got a slightly better deal in the Central Committee, with 16 members from ethnic origin compared to 10 only, five years ago.
Incidentally, the Tibetans have four representatives have been selected as members of the Central Committee (Lobsang Gyaltsen and Che Dalha) and Alternate members (Norbu Thondup and Yan Jinhai, a Tibetan from Qinghai); it is a first.
Further, Wang Huning, the newly-appointed member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee will probably represent Tibet at the National People’s Congress in March. The question is why a Han leader should represent Tibet; Han chauvinism will continue for some time more.
In any case, Wang’s presence does not mean that life will become easier for the Tibetans or the Uyghurs. Chen Quanguo, the former Party Tibet Secretary, presently posted in Xinjiang has been rewarded with a seat in the Politburo for the repressive measures that he introduced in the restive Muslim region.

What does this mean for India?
One will have to wait and see.
As Deng Xiaoping liked to say, ‘let us seek truth from facts’.
Thirty years ago or today, it is still not easy to read the future of the Middle Kingdom in tea leaves.


The abiding mystery of Kashgar

Indian (and Pakistani) Consulate in Kashgar: today a restaurant
My article The abiding mystery of Kashgar appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

After years of silence over the sudden closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, China, keen to have India as part of OBOR, is ready to reopen the consulate

Post-Independence, one of the most mysterious events which occurred in the early 1950s (and perhaps earlier), is still shrouded in veils; it is the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.
In a speech in the Parliament in December 1953, Nehru said, "Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. …But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there [we had to close our Consulate]."
At that time, nobody questioned these changes.
Though the Karakoram Pass was still witnessing a large number of caravans carrying on trade between Kashmir and Central Asia, Delhi accepted the closure of its Kashgar consulate as a fait accompli, just because a 'revolution' had taken place.
It is not that there was no opportunity to clarify why the Kashgar Consulate was closed, but strangely the issue was never raised, though a Top Secret note prepared for the Panchsheel Agreement negotiations in November 1953, says, "We could ask the Chinese Government to restore the normal traditional trade between Sinkiang and Kashmir, which has been completely stopped now. In fact, we had to close down our Consulate General in Kashgar and all our Indian traders have returned."
However, the Indian negotiators kept mum as Delhi was not keen to offer 'a bargaining counter for China to open more Consulates in India'.
Some documents recently declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bring some light on the 'revolutionary' events in Xinjiang in the early 1950s, particularly a summary of the happenings between 1950 and 1953. A section entitled 'Treatment of Foreigners' says: "The consulates general of Pakistan and India were closed in November 1949. Shortly after the Chinese Communist Army arrived in later December 1949 and in January 1950, restrictions were placed on the movements of people."
Why before the Chinese arrived? Again a mystery!
The Communists arrive in Urumqi
Though 'closed', the Indian Consulate continued to function normally during several months, but in the Fall of 1950, the Indian Consul General, Capt Ram Sathe (later Indian Ambassador in China) had to leave Kashgar …by the most treacherous land route, via the Karakoram pass.
Col PN Kaul, who later served in Lhasa as Consul General, mentions in his memoirs: "Our consul general in Kashgar, RD Sathe of the Indian Foreign Service and an ex-Army officer, and his wife also arrived in Leh during the winter of 1950, after their long and difficult journey from Kashgar. From distant Urumchi (Tiwah), the capital of Sinkiang, came the American consul general, Paxton, and his young wife. They had to stay with us before they could be airlifted. They had an exciting story to tell of their flight from Sinkiang. …Another person who dropped in over the passes later was the British vice-consul from Kashgar." All the foreign diplomats (except the Soviets) had no choice but to escape the Communist 'revolution'.
A few other reports from the CIA give a clearer picture of the happenings in Xinjiang. On March 21, 1951, the CIA notes: "the Chinese troops stationed in Sinkiang use systematic, disciplined violence for political reasons, …[while] rations, ammunition and military stores are received from the USSR."
The entire trade with Soviet Union and Central Asia was suddenly nationalised "and it is planned to nationalise the land. Sinkiang supplies wool, cotton and leather to the USSR, and in return receives kerosene, gasoline and old fish-plates from the USSR"
As a result, hundreds of Indian traders had to flee Kashgar; they travelled in appalling conditions before reaching Leh and Srinagar.
The CIA report continues: "almost all food in Sinkiang is being sent via Kashgar to the USSR by Russian trucks. Even the farmers have little food, and there is acute distress in the cities." At the time, there is not yet any active rebellion: "Russians are working in each Sinkiang government department."
Worse for the 'foreigners': "The Communists in Sinkiang spread anti-Pakistan, anti-British and anti-American propaganda, but because of the dislike of the Turki [Uyghur] population for the Communist Government, the propaganda has little effect."
Two years later, another report remarks: "the authorities were engaged in liquidating large numbers of people accused of having participated in the 1944 revolt against Chinese rule. [Sinkiang was then made an autonomous province supported by the USSR]."
Restrictions have greatly increased, notes the CIA: "it is necessary to obtain police permission before inviting guests to one's home. Further, the traditional fortification walls surrounding the two cities of Kashgar were torn down by forced labor: "All women in both cities were compelled to work at removing the debris resulting from the destruction. The men of Kashgar were being forced to work on the construction of roads and buildings."
During the last months of 1952 "the Government was vigorously pursuing its program for the redistribution of land. Every man agreeing to work in the fields was given 10 mows [a mow equals 0.1647 acres] of land which had been confiscated from wealthy landowners."
The report adds: "By the end of 1952 all profitable business, including the silk industry in Khotan, was under Government control. Private business was discouraged, and almost all shops had been turned into Government owned cooperative stores. The salaries paid to shopkeepers were barely enough to cover their living expenses. …any person found with gold or silver in his possession was suspected of engaging in black-market traffic in these metals, a crime, and was subjected to official interrogation concerning the manner in which he obtained it." These were the 'revolutionary' changes mentioned by Nehru.
What is striking is the omnipresence of the Soviets who, "posing as engineers, were in almost every town in southwestern Sinkiang."
Meanwhile, propaganda goes on full swing: "In every administrative unit youth organizations had been established to carry on propaganda work aimed at reactionary elements in the population. Pictures of Mao and Stalin were displayed in almost every home."
The officials in the Government of Sinkiang Province assured the people that "the Chinese in the administrative structure were there simply to teach the natives of Sinkiang the art of governing, and that soon the full Governmental administrative responsibility would be turned over to the people of Sinkiang." It is ironic that more than sixty years later, the Han cadres still control the restive province.
Reading these detailed CIA reports makes one understand the chaotic atmosphere in Xinjiang and particularly in Kashgar.
In October 1953, a short sentence at the end of a monthly report sent to Delhi by the Indian Ambassador to China, reads: "Indian Consulate General at Kashgar was closed by us during the month and Indian members of our staff started on their return journey home by the overland route."
No comment, no detail was given.
Returning to 2017, China is today keen that India should join the One Belt One Road initiative, in this case, the Indian Consulate in Kashgar should be reopened. It would be one proof of China's sincerity.

Wednesday, October 25, 2017

A strategic engagement with the European Union

This article A strategic engagement with the European Union was published two weeks ago in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.
I am posting it now as Madame Florence Parly, French Defense Minister arrives in Delhi on an important two-day visit to India. She will meet her lady counterpart, Nirmala Sitharaman and the Prime Minister.
She is due to inauguate the new facilities of DRAL (Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited) with Anil Ambani (Reliance group) et Eric Trappier (Dassault Aviation).
The collaboration between Reliance and Dassault is part of the offset deal for the purchase of 36 Rafales.

Here is the link...

With Modi having developed an excellent rapport with Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe. The Franco-German project can be a starter

It may not be possible to characterize the relations between France and India as ‘higher than the mountains, deeper than the ocean, sweeter than honey’; it may never go into such superlatives, but since the past 30 years the contacts have been based on ‘hard-rock’ foundation, formulated in the Strategic Partnership signed by President Chirac in Delhi in 1998. The contacts are based on mutual trust and a common vision of the world.
On May 15, Emmanuel Macron officially took over from President Hollande and the same day, he paid the traditional visit to the German Chancellor in Berlin; both leaders spoke of the importance of France–Germany relations for the European Union.
Between his investiture and his triumph in the legislative elections, the French President met the US President and hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin at the historic Palace of Versailles. Macron’s firm dealing in international issues could be seen for the first time, a radical change from the mild approach of his predecessor, the unpopular Francois Hollande.
On June 3, Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a short visit to Paris to congratulate and acquaint himself with the new French President. The talks were mainly centered around the Paris Conference on Environment as President Donald Trump had just announced that the US was withdrawing from the Paris Accord.
The talks with the Indian Prime Minister at the Elysee Palace lasted two hours. It was more than an ice-breaking exercise as the Indian Prime Minister had especially come back from Moscow to meet Macron.
Speaking after the talks, Modi declared that the Paris climate deal reflects "our duty towards protecting the Mother Earth and our natural resources. For us, protection of environment is an article of faith."
In this short time, something ‘passed’ between the two men, laying a firmer basis for future relations.
During the second week of December, President Macron will pay his maiden visit to India. Apart from the Solar Alliance in which both countries have invested energies and resources, the project of Smart Cities, dear to Mr Modi, will be discussed and taken forward. France has already adopted three cities, Chandigarh, French Architect Le Corbusier’s township, Nagpur and Puducherry.
Macron’s visit is perhaps the opportunity to go a step further.
On July 13, a day before Bastille Day, during a press conference jointly addressed by the French President and the German Chancellor in Paris, the two nations announced their intention to cooperate for the development of a future combat aircraft, which could one day replace the Rafale of Dassault Aviations and the Eurofighter/Typhoon. Mr Macron spoke of ‘road maps’ for joint investment opportunities in 18 areas, including a fifth-generation fighter plane.
Mr Macron said: “It is a deep revolution — but we are not scared of revolutions when they are conducted in peaceful manner.”
The French President sees this venture as part of a broader integration of several European partners for the development, deployment and export of combat equipment.
Airbus Defence and Space, which works on the Eurofighter, welcomed the announcement “to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet”. A communiqué added: “Strengthening the Franco-German axis will help to safeguard critically needed European defence capabilities in the future.”
Soon after the World War II, a man had a revolutionary proposal: to unite the enemies of yesterday, France and Germany, by bringing them to work together. Jean Monnet, the father of Europe wrote: “the course of events must be altered. To do this, men’s attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough.” Monnet thought that since both Germany and France had to rebuild their industry, it was bound to revive the old rivalry. Monnet’s idea was to reverse the problem — what had been the seed of war must become the seed of unity — his proposal was therefore to create a high authority which could manage the resources in coal and steel for both nations. This was hhe embryo of the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union.
Monet was a visionary; the world will be lead by multi-nation collaboration in the future. Take the example of the UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) developed by Dassault Aviation of France as the prime contractor, as demonstrated this. The nEUROn drone project perfectly reflects the original European ‘spirit’ though ironically, Germany is not directly associated. Six European countries have decided to build an UCAV as a technology demonstrator.
This European programme has been designed to pool the skills and know-how of Alenia Aermacchi (Italy), Saab (Sweden), EADS-CASA (Spain), HAI (Greece), RUAG (Switzerland) and Thales (France) to produce the drone of the future.
With a length of 10 metres, a wingspan of 12.5 metres and an empty weight of five tonnes, the aircraft is powered by a Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour engine.
It was French President Jacques Chirac who unveiled the Dassault-led nEUROn project in June 2005; the project crossed a major milestone on December 2012 when the UCAV had its first successful flight from Istres airbase, near Marseille in South France.
Dassault Aviation is the master builder, responsible for the overall architecture and design, flight control system, global testing (static and flight), elements of stealth, final assembly, integration of systems and testing.
NEUROn is undoubtedly an extraordinary technological challenge for the European companies involved.
Why could not India be involved in such like high-tech projects with France (and also the EU)?
Let us come back to the development of a fifth-generation combat aircraft. India has tried to work with the Russians. The project is not doing well.
Franz-Stefan Gady wrote in The Diplomat: “India, Russia 5th Generation Fighter Jet Deal is Lost”: “The transfer of sensitive defence technology from Russia to India has been one of the most contentious issues between the two sides right from the start.”
Gady commented: “India wants a guarantee that it will be able to upgrade the fighter jet in the future without Russian support, which would require Moscow sharing source codes (sensitive computer code that controls the fighter jet’s various systems — the key to an aircraft’s electronic brains).”
Delays are said to have been caused because New Delhi and Moscow disagree on many fundamental aspects such as work and cost share, aircraft technology or numbers of aircraft to be ordered by India.
Though presently theoretical, a question, could be raised, why can’t India join the Germano-French project? While Europe may not require hundreds of fifth generation aircrafts in the decades to come, India will need hundreds of planes, having to cope with two fronts.
Mr Modi has developed an excellent rapport with Mr Macron and Ms Merkel; it would make economic and strategic sense for India to partner Europe. It could be good for the European industries as well, as they would get crucial financial support and a market.
It is worth thinking about such a far-away possibility; it could be a win-win deal for India too as Delhi would be involved in the project from the conception.

Friday, October 20, 2017

The Communist High-Mass

The High-Mass of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has started.
Every five years, it follows the same precise ritual. The outgoing CCP’s General Secretary (in the present case, Xi Jinping), gives a 3 hour long speech, describing the internal and external changes facing the country, which the party needs to address.
Everything is scripted.
First, the election of 2287 delegates to the 19th Congress which took place months ago, among 40 ‘electoral blocs’ – representing each of China’s 31 provinces as well as the central party organs, national State institutions, the People’s Liberation Army, etc.
There are two types of delegates, the ‘big shots’ who will make it to the 200-odd member Central Committee (CC) and the ‘grass-root’ delegates which count for nearly half of the delegates; and five or seven ‘big ones’ who will eventually reach the Communist Paradise, the Politburo’s Standing Committee.
The Party Congress has three main purposes.
First, it establishes a new party line to be followed for five years; the Congress is the authoritative body to do so. The ‘draft’ read by the General Secretary has been seen and commented by thousands and hundreds of amendments have already been incorporated.
Alice Miller, one of the best experts in CCP’s affairs wrote: “Over the course of its session, a party congress sets down a consensus evaluation of the party’s work over the five-year period since the preceding congress and an assessment of the party’s present situation, and it sets forth general guidelines—the party’s line—for the party’s priorities, emphases, and tasks for the coming five-year period until the next congress.”
At the end, a resolution will endorse Xi Jinping’s speech establishing the party’s consensus on all policies that the party leadership will face.
Then, according to the Constitution, a CC Plenum must convene at least once a year to follow up on the directions given by the Congress.
The second purpose of the Meet is to revise the Party’s Constitution and introduce changes such as a new theory, a brain-child of the current Secretary General.
Finally, the Congress nominates a new leadership for the five years to come. It includes the CC whose plenums give directions to the Party between two Congresses, but also some 170 alternate members whose role is replace the CC’s full-members when required (when full members are sent to jail for corruption for example), as well as a new Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDIC), whose job is to tackle corruption.
Finally, before the Congress closes its doors, the CC’s first Plenum will appoint the top party leadership. It also nominates the all-powerful Central Military Commission, a new Secretariat (the body that facilitates the implementation of Politburo decisions) as well as the State Council or Cabinet, headed by the Premier, usually the No 2 in the Party’s hierarchy.
During his speech on October 18, President Xi Jinping outlined his vision for the next five years of China’s development. According to The South China Morning Post, “he vowed to step up ideological guidance within the party, strengthen its anti-corruption campaign, retain the government’s grip on Hong Kong and Macau, and oppose any moves towards independence in Taiwan.”
One of the most expected parts of the speech was the inclusion of Xi’s so-called political philosophy; it will thereafter be known as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’.
The new motto will be repeated thousand times all-over the Middle Kingdom. It is said that there are 14 elements behind the elaborated concept; the first is that Party should lead in every aspect of life in China. Xi declared that “the dream of national rejuvenation would only be a fantasy without the leadership of China’s Communist Party. The party should lead in all areas and the authority of the party central leadership should be respected.”
Other highlights are ambitious targets to be achieved during the next 30 years and more, “From 2035 to 2050, China should become a nation with pioneering global influence.” The momentum of the anti-corruption campaign is ‘irreversible’ and rule by law would be maintained.
Of course, national security would be boosted and the Party would resolutely protect its sovereignty and interests. Xi spoke of ‘historical breakthrough’ in national defence and military reform: “The navy has protected the nation’s maritime interest and its army rapidly upgraded its weaponry. …The People’s Liberation Army should be a ‘world class’ force by 2050.”
Some in India may think, it is not necessary to worry; 2050 is far-away. However it is crucial to watch the CMC’s new composition. It may bring radical changes and surprises which could determine if new ‘Doklam’ incidents would take place in the years to come.
Sharp observers have predicted that the number of Vice-Chairmen of the Commission may go from two to four. Some of Xi Jinping’s close allies are expected to be promoted.
One is General Zhang Youxia, director of the Equipment Development Department, who is tipped to become one of two vice chairmen, while present vice chairman, Xu Qiliang, is expected to stay on. Zhang, like Xi is native from the northwestern province of Shaanxi and both he and Xi are children of former senior PLA officials.
The other two candidates are Li Zuocheng, director of the Joint Staff Department and Miao Hua, the new head of the Political Department; they may also make it.
Whether China will follow a ‘peaceful rise’ or a more tumultuous one, will depends on the capacity of Xi to impose a ‘rule of law’.
If the generals remain ‘wild’ as in the past, India may have to face a serious situation.
The battle is not yet played out.

The Tibetans in full costume 
Apart from the Secretary General's speech,  is it interesting to look at the attire of the delegates.
On the second day of the 19th Congress, the delegates of the 31 provinces met separately.
While most of the delegates wore suit and tie, the Tibetans had to show off their regional attire.
Just have a look at these photos.
Hubei Province delegation
Anhui Province delegation
Yunnan Province delegation

Fujian Province delegation
Delegation of the central financial organs

Qinghai Province delegation
Guangdong Province delegation

Gansu Province delegation

Zhejiang Province delegation
And now the Tibetan delegation.
Out of 29 delegates, 11 Tibetans are from the 'grass root'.
While the 'big shots', from the regional Standing Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region like Wu Yingjie, Lobsang Gyaltsen or Che Dralha wore suits and ties, the 'grass root' delegates have no choice but to show their regional costumes.
It is always a great attraction for the journalists and photographers.
Can it be considered as a display of Tibetan culture?
Are the delegates just for the show in Beijing ?
Difficult to say.